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Over the course of the 1990s economists appeared to favour exchange rate regimes 
that were either completely flexible or rigidly fixed through mechanisms such as 
currency boards.  According to this “bipolar” view of exchange rates, intermediate 
regimes were deemed to be ineffective and prone to crisis. This paper examines the 
link between exchange rate regimes and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
programme use and finds fairly strong evidence that countries with intermediate 
exchange rate regimes are less likely to go to the IMF than others. To the extent that 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) programmes are a proxy for balance of payments 
difficulties, this finding supports the more recent, nuanced, literature on exchange rate 
regime choice.   
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The debate over the relative merits and demerits of alternative exchange rate regimes 
has been a central component of international macroeconomics for as long as the 
subject has existed.  The issues involved, both theoretical and empirical, are complex.  
Even so, during the second half of the 1990s, and with a spate of economic crises in 
various parts of the world, a consensus of sorts appeared to form that any attempt to 
‘softly’ manage exchange rates in a world of capital mobility was unwise.  This it 
seemed had been a common feature of the crisis countries.  Instead, the consensus 
view was that emerging and developing countries should opt for either of the corner 
solutions in preference to any intermediate exchange rate regime.  The ‘bi-polar’ view 
was that hard pegging in the form of a currency union, or full exchange rate flexibility 
were superior to any regime in between the two and that either of the extreme 
exchange rate regimes would be less vulnerable to crisis. 
 
However, the consensus was not complete; it was perhaps premature when evaluated 
against its theoretical and empirical justification.  The bi-polar view was driven by a 
somewhat superficial analysis of a relatively small number of crisis countries over a 
relatively short period of time.  The logic behind it seemed to be that the only pegging 
regime that would carry credibility with international capital markets would be a hard 
and immutable peg.  Therefore if a country were not to select this alternative, it would 
be better to opt for full flexibility.  But subsequent discussion has recalled the 
disadvantages of both hard pegging and free flexibility for emerging and developing 
countries; it has pointed to the fact that not all intermediate regimes have been 
vulnerable to crisis; and it has highlighted the difficulty of defining what constitutes a 
hard peg.  After all, initially, and prior to the crisis in Argentina in the early 2000s 
currency boards were widely perceived as an example of hard pegging.  Finally, 
credibility is more likely to be associated with the internal consistency of an array of 
macroeconomic policies.  The sustainability of any exchange rate regime will depend 
importantly on the other macroeconomic policies that accompany it.  This has led 
some to claim that it is not possible to say that any one particular exchange rate 
regime is universally preferable to any other. 
   3
Whilst the theoretical debate continues, a number of studies have begun to appear that 
try to test empirically and rigorously whether some exchange rate regimes are more 
commonly associated with crises than others.  Although not always presented in this 
way, these studies examine the empirical support for the bi-polar view.  Such studies 
raise a series of methodological issues.  How are exchange rate regimes to be defined 
and captured empirically, and how are crises to be measured?  They also carry with 
them important policy implications.  If certain exchange rate regimes appear to be 
more sustainable and significantly less prone to crisis, surely this should feed into 
future decisions about the choice of exchange rate regime, and indeed to the advice 
proferred by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
This paper seeks to contribute to the evolving literature which examines the 
association between exchange rate regimes and the incidence of crises.  It differs from 
existing studies in various ways.  First, it makes use of the Reinhart-Rogoff 
classification of exchange rate regimes (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) and therefore 
allows for the possibility that actual de facto regime choices may differ from 
announced de jure ones.  Second, it uses IMF arrangements as a proxy for economic 
crisis.  While some countries may encounter crises and still avoid borrowing from the 
IMF, it is reasonable to assume that all countries that negotiate active arrangements 
with the IMF are facing some type of economic crisis.  All the cases of crisis during 
the 1990s that led up to the bi-polar consensus on exchange rate regimes involved 
IMF arrangements.  But even if data on IMF arrangements fail to capture all crises as 
measured in other ways, such as those identified by using an index of foreign 
exchange market pressure, they do capture perfectly the incidence of IMF 
arrangements!  Thus a more specific description of this paper is that it examines 
empirically the association between the involvement of the IMF in terms of 
negotiating programmes and the nature of the exchange rate regime.  Is it empirically 
true that countries that have opted for the corner solutions are less likely to end up 
having to turn to the IMF for assistance, as the bi-polar view would suggest?  Or, 
contrary to this view, is the selection of an intermediate exchange rate regime 
associated with a lower probability of an IMF arrangement?  Or is there simply no 
association one way or the other? 
   4
The paper is organised in the following way.  Section 2 provides a brief summary of 
the recent literature in order to put into context the new research reported in this 
paper.  Section 3 explains the methodology adopted and the results discovered.   
Section 4 briefly examines the policy implications of the results.  Finally, Section 5 
summarises the principal contribution of the paper and conjectures about some 
possible explanations for the results that are discovered. 
 
 
2. Exchange Rate Regimes, Crises and the IMF: A Contextual and Literature 
Review 
 
In principle, all exchange rate regimes have well recognised potential advantages and 
disadvantages.
1 Firmly pegged rates may encourage foreign trade and investment, 
may impose discipline on domestic monetary and fiscal policy and may carry 
sufficient credibility to help avoid speculative attacks.  But, in the long run and 
because things change, a pegged nominal exchange rate is likely to imply a 
disequilibrium real exchange rate, unless there is a significant degree of domestic 
price flexibility that allows the real exchange rate to alter.  Without this, defending 
hard pegs may involve significant output losses. 
 
Flexible nominal exchange rates may allow an equilibrium real exchange rate to be 
maintained over time but may be volatile and discourage foreign trade and 
investment.  They will impose fewer constraints on domestic macroeconomic policy 
but, as a consequence, may generate less confidence within capital markets. 
 
Intermediate regimes may combine the best or worst of both worlds.  The best would 
be where they limit volatility and the possibility that exchange rates will overshoot 
their long run equilibrium, but also provide some degree of discretion over the 
conduct of domestic macroeconomic policy.  The worst would be where they generate 
neither the confidence associated with hard pegs nor the flexibility required to 
maintain equilibrium real rates.  In these circumstances, and with mobile international 
capital, they may be particularly vulnerable to speculative attack. 
   5
It was this perceived shortcoming of intermediate exchange rate regimes, as well as 
the incidence of crises during the 1990s in countries that tried to manage their 
exchange rates and resist devaluation, that culminated in the bi-polar view that 
intermediate regimes were inferior to either of the extremes.  Simultaneously, the 
existing currency crisis literature suggested that crises of either a first or second 
generation type were likely to be associated with a relatively weak commitment to 
manage exchange rates i.e. with intermediate exchange rate regimes lacking 
credibility
3 rather than with hard pegs or floating. 
 
The bi-polar view has, however, been open to challenge.  Intermediate regimes have 
not been readily abandoned and seem to work satisfactorily in some instances 
(Masson, 2001, Bubula and Otker-Robe, 2002, Corden, 2003, and Husain, Mody and 
Rogoff, 2005).  Moreover, corner solutions are not insulated from market pressures 
and may be associated with exchange rate misalignments that undermine their 
sustainability (Williamson, 2000, Corden, 2003).  Typical of those who have been 
sceptical of the bi-polar view, Frankel (1999) argues that no single exchange rate 
regime is right for all countries at all times. 
 
Apart from the largely casual empiricism upon which ‘bipolarism’ has been based, 
and the better structured examination of case studies that is more nuanced (Corden 
2003), there have been relatively few systematic empirical studies that have sought to 
examine the connection between exchange rate regimes and economic crisis.
4  
 
Defining them as sharp falls in the exchange rate, the IMF (1997) found that, over the 
period 1975-96, crises had occurred under all forms of de jure exchange rate regime.  
In a more recent study, and using the currency crises identified by Glick and 
Hutchison (1999), Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003) find that firmly pegged regimes 
carry the lowest probability of crisis.
5 Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003) build on this 
work.  They use their own de facto classification of exchange rate regimes and 
distinguish between soft and hard pegs.  They define currency crises as episodes of 
severe market pressure as reflected by sharp movements in both exchange rates and 
interest rates.  This allows them to identify speculative attacks that were successfully 
repelled as well as those that led to devaluations. They then measure how crisis-prone 
different regimes are by computing the frequency with which crises occurred under   6
each regime, rather than by examining the share of each regime in the total number of 
crises.  They find that pegged regimes are more crisis-prone than floating regimes, 
particularly for developed and emerging market economies that are integrated with 
international capital markets. For 1990-2001 and across all countries they find that, 
although the polar extremes are not exempt from crisis, intermediate regimes – 
whatever precise form they take – are more crisis-prone; they interpret this as 
providing support for the bi-polar view.
6 
 
In a related study Husain, Mody and Rogoff (2005) (henceforth HMR) investigate the 
durability of exchange rate regimes.  In the light of the bi-polar view one might expect 
intermediate exchange rate regimes to be less durable on average than hard pegs or 
fully floating regimes and for countries to exit from them.  HMR discover a more 
complex picture.  Using the Reinhart-Rogoff ‘natural’ classification of exchange 
rates, which they claim is superior to other available classifications because it 
distinguishes between freely floating and freely falling exchange rates (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2004), they find that countries benefit by having increasingly flexible 
exchange rate regimes as they become richer and more financially developed.  For 
more advanced economies, flexible exchange rate regimes are more durable.  On the 
other hand, for developing countries with little access to international capital markets, 
pegged regimes are ‘notable for their durability’.  For emerging market economies 
during the 1990s, by contrast, pegs are the least durable regime and carry a high risk 
of crisis.  Contrary to what bipolarism would predict, HMR find that there is no 
tendency for intermediate exchange rate regimes to give way to regimes at the 
corners. This is especially the case in emerging economies where the bi-polar view 
might have been anticipated to be at its most relevant.  For the two decades prior to 
2001, when their data end, most emerging economies had opted for intermediate 
regimes and showed no inclination to move away from them. Indeed, the overall trend 
appears to be in the opposite direction away from pegging and towards intermediate 
exchange rate regimes. 
 
HMR find that the incidence of ‘twin’ banking and currency crises in emerging 
economies is highest under pegged exchange rate regimes and that it declines as the 
exchange rate becomes more flexible.
7 
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Although they may be resolved by deeper analysis and by greater disaggregation, the 
evidence reported above sends out mixed messages.  Although some studies suggest 
that intermediate exchange rate regimes may be the most prone to crisis, others 
suggest that pegged rate regimes may carry a greater risk, particularly for countries 
that are internationally financially integrated. Moreover, the durability of intermediate 
regimes and the reluctance of many countries to abandon them appears to be 
inconsistent with the bi-polar view. 
 
Different findings across the various studies may in part be accounted for by the 
country sample used, the time period studied, the way in which crises are measured 
and the classification of exchange rates adopted.  There is growing agreement that it 
may be unsafe to use the official de jure classification of exchange rates since the way 
in which countries actually behave may differ from the way in which they announce 
they will behave.
8 There remains some disagreement over the best way of identifying 
crises and capturing market pressures. 
 
An alternative approach is to use IMF arrangements as a proxy for economic crisis.  
This measure will not be perfect.  Some crisis countries – mainly, but not only, 
advanced economies – may be able to avoid borrowing from the Fund even during a 
crisis.  Furthermore, it has been suggested that some governments may seek a Fund 
arrangement even when their economies are not in crisis, as a way of endorsing 
domestic economy policy or creating a ‘scapegoat’ (Vreeland, 2003). 
 
But there remain logical reasons to believe that a country’s proclivity to use IMF 
credits will be influenced by its choice of exchange rate regime.  In order to borrow 
from the IMF countries have to be able to demonstrate a balance of payments ‘need’.  
This need is conventionally associated with a current account deficit but could also 
reflect a turn around in capital flows.  In either event governments have to make a 
choice about balance of payments policy. They could seek to adjust by devaluing the 
exchange rate (expenditure switching) or by compressing aggregate domestic demand 
(expenditure reduction).  Alternatively they could seek to finance the deficit by 
foreign borrowing.  If private capital markets or aid donors are not prepared to 
provide the finance (at least on their own), this will probably mean turning to the IMF.  
Other things being constant, countries that are more committed to defending the   8
exchange rate, ie. with pegged or managed exchange rate regimes, will be more likely 
to borrow from the IMF than those with flexible exchange rate regimes. 
 
Studies that have sought to explain IMF lending have generally discovered that the 
nature of the official exchange rate regime is a significant factor (see for example 
Conway, 1994, Knight and Santaella, 1997, Bird, 1996, Thacker, 1999, Bird and 
Rowlands, 2001, 2005).  In and of itself it is interesting to explore this issue in more 
detail.  Does the de jure nature of the exchange rate regime significantly affect the 
probability of having an arrangement with the IMF, and if so, in what way?  Is there a 
form of bi-polarity, as flexible exchange rates allow countries to avoid balance of 
payments crises, and hard pegs generate confidence in the disciplined conduct of 
domestic macroeconomic policy and a willingness to lend in capital markets, allowing 
hard peggers to by-pass the Fund?  Or does the probability of involving the IMF 
diminish reasonably smoothly as the exchange rate regime becomes more flexible?  It 
is these questions that the remainder of this paper examines.  The policy implications 
are also important.  What type of exchange rate regime is most likely to reduce a 
country’s demand for IMF programmes? 
 
 
3. An Empirical Analysis: Methodology and Results 
 
To determine the relationship between exchange rate arrangements and the use of 
IMF programmes we first divide countries into groups based on their exchange rate 
regime, and then examine their propensity to sign IMF programmes. This simple 
examination and testing of probabilities is then supplemented with an empirical 
analysis of IMF programme signings using a probit estimation.  We focus on 
emerging and developing countries since advanced countries have not used IMF 
sources since the mid 1970s. 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) have argued persuasively that the traditional classification 
of exchange rate regimes is misleading, and offer an alternative classification system.  
We use their annual “coarse” classification system that divides exchange rate regimes 
into five categories.
9 According to their typology, category
 1 one includes the most 
rigid or fixed exchange rate systems, including the use of another country’s currency,   9
a formal peg or currency board, a de facto peg, or a pre-announced horizontal band 
that is narrow (less than two percent on either side of the peg). Higher categories are 
associated with more flexible regimes.  Thus category 2 includes de facto and pre 
announced crawling pegs or bands with trading bands narrower than two percent 
around the announced value. Category 3 includes exchange rate regimes with wider 
crawling bands, moving bands, as well as managed floats.  Categories 4 and 5 are 
‘freely floating’ and ‘freely falling’, respectively.
10 A sixth category identifies 
exchange rate systems that cannot be identified due to missing data.  
 
While there are strong a priori reasons for using the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
classification, for robustness we also conducted the analysis for the traditional de jure 
IMF exchange rate classification. The IMF classification system has four regimes 
ranging from a fixed exchange rate (category 1) to pure floating (category 4).  The 
simple correlation between these two competing classification systems is only 0.3339 
for our sample of low and middle-income countries between 1974 and 2000 (not 
including the missing exchange rate systems in category 6 from Reinhart and 
Rogoff).
11  Despite this considerable divergence between the competing classification 
systems, the results reported later in this section are consistent for both of them. 
 
We first examine the frequency of IMF programme signing for countries with 
different exchange rate regimes.  Each observation corresponds to a particular country 
and year. Table 1 shows the percentage of countries with each exchange rate regime 
that signs an agreement either in the current year or the following year.
12  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results from Table 1 indicate a pattern of IMF use that contradicts the bipolar 
view; countries with intermediate exchange rate regimes require IMF programmes 
less frequently than other countries.
13 For the most part these observed differences in 
probabilities are statistically significant. For the Reinhart and Rogoff classification, 
countries with exchange rate categories 1, 4 and 6 are statistically the same as the full 
sample in terms of propensities to sign IMF agreements in the current or following 
year.  Countries with narrow or wide bands and managed floats have significantly 
lower propensities to sign an IMF agreement than the full sample (and are themselves   10
statistically indistinct) while the propensity for countries with freely falling currencies 
is significantly higher.  The results for the IMF classification system are roughly 
similar.  Countries with fixed exchange rate systems have a slightly lower probability 
of signing an IMF agreement. The intermediate exchange rate regimes of crawling 
pegs and similar arrangements are associated with significantly lower propensities to 
sign an IMF agreement than the average, or than fixed exchange rate regimes.   
Countries with managed floats and pure floating exchange rates have significantly 
elevated propensities of ending up with an IMF programme.  
 
It is possible that the correlation between exchange rate regime and IMF programme 
use reported in Table 1 is spurious in the sense of reflecting the influence of other 
variables. To examine this possibility, we estimated a probit model of IMF 
programme signings.  We selected explanatory variables that are commonly used in 
the literature on IMF programme signing.
14 We focus primarily on the economic 
variables in the results presented here.
15 The explanatory variables reflect domestic 
economic performance (per capita GNP, GDP growth), balance of payments 
performance (reserve levels, changes in reserves, the current account balance, current 
account balance changes, and real exchange rate depreciation) international 
indebtedness (the debt service ratio, changes in the debt service ratio, the publicly 
guaranteed external debt to GDP level, and indicators of past, present, and imminent 
future rescheduling needs) and past IMF programme use (which has often been found 
to be the most significant explanatory factor).  Finally, we include the Reinhart and 
Rogoff exchange rate classification in both a linear and squared form. The results are 
presented in Table 2. 
  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
  
The exchange rate variables have statistically significant coefficient estimates that are 
consistent with the results reported in Table 1. Intermediate exchange rate regimes 
have a significantly lower statistical association with the subsequent signing of an 
IMF programme than their more rigid or more flexible alternatives.  Solving for the 
minimum of the quadratic equation in exchange rate classes that is implicit in the 
probit estimation, it is apparent that countries with category 3 exchange rate regimes   11
(including exchange rates with wider bands and managed floats) have the least 
likelihood of signing an IMF agreement, ceteris paribus.   
 
This basic result is confirmed when the estimation is reproduced using dummy 
variables for the main categories in place of the linear and quadratic representation of 
the Reinhart and Rogoff classification scale. One equation used four dummy variables 
to represent categories 1, 2, 3, and 4 and 5 together.  A second equation combined the 
two intermediate categories (2 and 3) together as one variable.  In these 
supplementary estimations the highest probability of signing an IMF agreement is 
associated with the fixed exchange rate regimes, the second highest coefficient for the 
flexible category, and the lowest for the intermediate categories. 
16   
 
 To try and understand further this phenomenon, and to investigate the robustness of 
the results, we examined the association between exchange rate regimes and IMF 
programmes across different time periods and for different levels of per capita 
income.  The sample was first divided into the 1974-1989 and 1990-2000 periods. The 
results for these sub periods, reported in Table 3, are consistent with those for the full 
sample. Countries with intermediate exchange rate regimes (classes 2 and 3) have the 
least propensity to go to the IMF for an agreement for both time periods. Countries 
with fixed exchange rates have slightly higher rates of IMF use than the norm for the 
full sample. Not surprisingly, those countries with ‘freely falling’ currencies have the 
highest rate of IMF programme use.  It is important to note, however, that the small 
numbers of countries with freely floating exchange rates had relatively low rates of 
IMF use in the second sub period.  
  
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
We also divided the sample into a low income group and a middle income group (see 
Table 4).
17  As before, poor countries with fixed exchange rate regimes  had slightly 
above average rates of IMF programme use. Poor countries with intermediate 
exchange rate regimes (2 and 3) had lower than average use.  Poor countries with 
freely floating or freely falling exchange rates had higher than average propensities to 
turn to the IMF.  By contrast, the better off countries in the sample exhibited a more 
varied relationship between their exchange rate regime and their use of IMF   12
programmes.  Not surprisingly, their overall use of IMF programmes was less than for 
the poorer countries.  The lowest use of IMF programmes was for the very few cases 
of free floating. The next lowest use of IMF programmes was for countries with 
narrow-band intermediate regimes, followed closely by the regimes on either side 
(categories 1 and 3). Finally, and as would be expected, better off countries 
experiencing freely falling exchange rates had by far the highest rate of IMF 
programme use.  These countries were able to operate fixed exchange rate regimes 
without needing to go to the IMF as frequently as the poorer countries.  Indeed from 
the data for better off countries in Table 4, it is difficult to make a convincing case for 
the superiority of any particular exchange rate regime in terms of being able to avoid 
IMF programmes.  Free floating has the best record but the number of observations is 
small.  
  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Next, we examined the relationship between changes in exchange rate regime and 
IMF programme use.  Table 5 shows the data for IMF programme use according to 
initial and final exchange rate regime, indicating the proportion of countries that 
signed an IMF agreement during the current or subsequent year, and the number of 
observations in each category. The survival rate of exchange rate regimes (the 
proportion of cases in which a specific exchange rate regime survived for the next 
period) is also provided. 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Our data indicate that regime change is generally associated with more intense use of 
IMF programmes.
 18 While moving to freely floating exchange rates was not common, 
moving to a ‘freely falling’ exchange rate regime was the most frequently observed 
regime switch, though presumably not one that was chosen voluntarily.  For those 
countries that rejected freely flexible exchange rates, the intermediate regimes 
(categories 2 and 3) were the most frequently chosen options for countries switching 
exchange rate regimes. When countries switched into or away from these intermediate 
regimes, their reliance on the IMF was generally lower, as shown more clearly in 
Table 6.   13
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE  
 
Finally, following on from the assertions in the literature regarding the role of capital 
controls, we investigated the link between the presence of controls and the incidence 
of IMF programmes.  The general proposition is that controls help to limit the 
difficulties surrounding balance of payments problems, and their presence might 
therefore be presumed to significantly decrease the need to approach the IMF for 
assistance.  Data on the presence of controls are taken from the IMF Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, though there are problems 
with these data (Rowlands, 1999).
 19  
 
Table 7 shows the relationship between exchange rate regimes and the presence of 
capital controls.  Aside from the general prevalence of controls in developing and 
emerging markets for the 1974-2000 period (with controls being present in 84 percent 
of the cases), countries are more likely to have such controls when their exchange 
rates are relatively flexible. This is somewhat unexpected, as the traditional 
“trilemma” in international monetary economics suggests that controls (or the 
avoidance of free capital movements) are likely to accompany fixed exchange rates as 
a means of acquiring a degree of autonomy for monetary policy.  
 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
In terms of the effects on a country’s proclivity to adopt an IMF programme, the 
presence of capital account controls had little effect.  Indeed, independent of the 
exchange rate regime (with the exception of the freely falling category) countries with 
capital controls use IMF programmes with greater frequency. When an additional 
variable indicating the presence of capital controls is included in the full sample 
estimations its estimated coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant.  When 
this new equation is estimated for each exchange rate category separately, the 
presence of controls has a statistically significant negative effect on a country’s 
proclivity to turn to the IMF only when it has a freely falling exchange rate. This 
negative effect dominates when the regression is re-estimated for the flexible regime   14
(categories 4 and 5 combined), though the estimated coefficient has a weak level of 
significance (at the 5.4% level only).
20 
 
Therefore the evidence indicates quite strongly that countries with intermediate 
exchange rate regimes are less reliant on IMF programmes, an indication of their 
greater independent sustainability. When regime changes occur, these intermediate 
regimes are less likely to require IMF assistance to smooth the transition, and when 
adopted as a consequence of regime change, are similarly more self-sustaining.   
Finally, the sustainability of the intermediate regimes does not seem to rely on the use 
of controls on capital flows.  
 
4. Policy Implications 
 
The bi-polar approach to choosing exchange rate regimes argues in favor of either 
hard pegs such as currency union or dollarisation at one end of the spectrum or full 
flexibility at the other. It does not advocate one of the corners specifically. From a 
policy point of view what it opposes is any type of intermediate regime such as soft 
pegs or managed floating, which it presents as being particularly vulnerable to crisis 
unless bolstered by capital controls. 
 
The IMF gives advice to its 184 members countries on the choice of exchange rate 
regime both as part of its regular Article IV consultations and as part of the 
negotiations that lead to IMF programmes. But what advice should it give? It has 
sometimes seemed a little uncertain and has changed its view with respect to 
individual countries over time. This vacillation has perhaps been especially the case in 
terms of currency boards and dollarisation. Of course in the case of (quasi) hard pegs 
an important issue is their effect on market confidence. An exchange rate regime 
choice that seems unwise ex ante and would not have been recommended by the Fund 
may ex post be defended. A situation may arise therefore where the Fund would not 
have advocated a particular regime, but once adopted would not advocate its 
abandonment either since this would adversely affect a government’s reputation.  
 
Although it is difficult to identify a ‘Fund view’ on exchange rate regimes, statements 
by senior members of the Fund in the early 2000s hinted at a preference for flexible   15
exchange rates. Certainly the Fund has been associated with the idea that soft pegging 
is unsustainable, and in this regard has aligned itself to some extent with the bi-polar 
approach (Fischer, 2001).  
 
The new results reported in this paper suggest, however, that if the IMF is seeking to 
minimize the claims on its resources and to ensure that countries do not become 
recidivists or frequent uses, it would be unwise to universally advise developing and 
emerging economies to avoid intermediate exchange rate regimes. Indeed, if anything 
our results generally imply just the opposite. It is attempts to firmly peg exchange 
rates that carry a relatively higher risk of needing IMF assistance. The Fund should 
perhaps express a greater degree of agnosticism regarding exchange rate choice for its 
developing and emerging market members. It should certainly not be prejudiced 
against intermediate regimes and should not align itself with bipolarism. Its advice 
about exchange rate regimes should be flexible and it should not seek to eliminate 
intermediate regimes at the outset. The middle ground may remain fertile, and perhaps 
more fertile than the extremes.
 21  
 
Similarly, countries themselves might rightly be more assertive in their choice of 
exchange rate system. Assuming that they wish to minimize reliance on the IMF, the 
adoption of intermediate regimes might be quite sensible for many governments. Of 
course the choice of exchange rate regime will depend on many conditions, including 
those that help determine the stability of the adopted system. But what factors 
influence the sustainability of exchange rate regimes? Our study does not allow us to 
say with certainty, but it is possible to make some suggestions. These conjectures we 
confine to the next and final section of the paper. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
At the end of the 1990s, and in the aftermath or a series of crises in emerging 
economies, a consensus formed around the bi-polar approach to choosing exchange 
rate regimes. The IMF appeared to be part of the consensus. The approach suggested 
that developing and emerging economies should opt for either firm fixity or for free 
flexibility but nothing in between. However, detractors from the consensus remained   16
unconvinced and there has been little attempt to systematically test the bi-polar 
approach or more generally the association between exchange rate regimes and the 
incidence of economic crises. 
 
This study seeks to make a contribution by examining the association between 
exchange rate regimes, using the Reinhart-Rogoff classification, and the incidence of 
IMF programmes, which are in some sense a proxy measure of economic crisis but 
are of interest in and of themselves. We find that the evidence is inconsistent with bi-
polarism. Across a full sample of developing and emerging countries over 1974-2000 
intermediate exchange rate regimes are significantly less likely to be associated with 
IMF programmes than either firmly fixed regimes or freely flexible regimes. Pegged 
rate systems carry with them the highest probability of IMF involvement. 
 
Although we merely set out to investigate an empirical relationship, it may be 
interesting to conjecture why we find what we do. Countries with fixed exchange 
rates have stated a preference for not using the currency value as an instrument for 
adjusting to balance of payments disequilibria. This means that when balance of 
payments deficits occur, they either need to adjust by other means or they need to 
finance them, effectively borrowing to defend the pegged exchange rate. Unless it can 
be switched by using policies apart from the exchange rate, expenditure will have to 
be reduced. Expenditure reduction will lead to output losses and will be politically 
unpopular. Therefore countries with pegged exchange rate regimes will be particularly 
likely to end up borrowing from the IMF. Overall, this is what we find.  
 
Intermediate exchange rate regimes allow governments more degrees of policy 
freedom. Exchange rates can be altered in circumstances other than in a crisis when a 
large devaluation may be unavoidable. Moreover, there is some scope for independent 
fiscal and monetary policy to achieve domestic objectives. This is the textbook case 
for intermediate regimes. Where the policy discretion is sensibly used, balance of 
payments crises can be avoided and therefore also the need to turn to the Fund for 
assistance. 
 
If this is a reasonable interpretation of our findings it suggests that Corden (2003) is 
indeed correct that one can be “too sensational” about the choice of exchange rate   17
regime. It is the package of macroeconomic policies that is important rather than any 
particular component of the package in isolation. Are the policies consistent, in which 
case the exchange rate regime will be sustainable, or are they not, in which case it 
won’t. The crises in the 1990s which were widely associated with intermediate 
exchange rate regimes are, according to this view, more accurately interpreted as 
reflecting an inappropriate mix of macroeconomic policies. Of course these crises 
may also be interpreted in other ways, including as manifestations of systemic 
problems resulting from speculation and volatility in international capital markets.  
 
Political variables will influence the extent to which certain packages of policies are 
sustainable. For example, firm exchange rate pegging will be difficult to sustain in 
circumstances where balance of payments deficits need to be corrected and there is 
strong political resistance to rising unemployment and falling living standards. An 
interesting case study might be Argentina’s currency board which survived the tequila 
effect of the Mexican crisis in 1994 but was unable to withstand the economic and 
political pressures placed on it at the beginning of the 2000s. Europe is a case where it 
may be possible to sustain a currency union because of the strong political motivation 
towards integration. 
 
Flexible exchange rate regimes allow the greatest discretion in terms of domestic 
fiscal and monetary policy. But again the discretion may be misused with large fiscal 
deficits leading to monetary expansion and nominal exchange rate depreciation. 
Combined with the problem of excessive volatility, it is feasible to see why countries 
with flexible exchange rate regimes may still end up with IMF programmes, even 
though this may be a less common occurrence than it is for countries with fixed rates. 
 
Compared with the alternatives, intermediate exchange rate regimes may, in principle, 
provide an appropriate blend of macroeconomic discipline on the one hand, and the 
ability to avoid unacceptable output losses on the other. When governments opt for a 
consistent package of macroeconomic policies which is generally perceived as such, 
and appear committed to maintaining a steady policy course, there is little reason to 
believe that confidence will be eroded in capital markets. Indeed it may be fostered. In 
these circumstances, economic crises can be avoided and it will be unnecessary to 
borrow from the IMF. In the light of our results, the IMF should be encouraging   18
countries to come up with consistent overall macroeconomic strategies rather than 
persuading them to opt for any particular exchange rate regime. However, the Fund’s 
advice should certainly not understate the attractions of packages based on 
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Table 1: The probabilities of signing an IMF agreement, by exchange rate regime 
(1974-2000) 
 




Exchange Rate Classification 






All types  0.227  0.230  2282/2268 
1 (most fixed)  0.257  0.248  769/767 
2 (narrow bands)  0.176*  0.177*  539/540 
3 (wider bands, managed float)  0.163*  0.177*  528/526 
4 (freely floating)  0.351   0.25  37/40 





6 (missing)  0.177  0.226  62/62 
All types  0.192  0.193  3104/3069 
1 (fixed)   0.159*  0.169*  2039/2026 
2 (limited flexibility)  0.085*  0.039*  82/77 




4 (floating)  0.312*  0.287*  365/349 
* indicates statistically distinct from the “all types” sample at the 5% level. 
 
 




Explanatory variable  Estimated coefficient  Normal test statistic 
Constant 
GNP per capita 
GDP growth 
Reserve-to-import ratio 
% change in reserves-to-imports 
Current Account Balance/GDP 
% change in the current account  
Real exchange rate depreciation 
Debt service-to-exports ratio 
% change in the debt-service ratio 
Public external debt –to-GDP ratio 
Current rescheduling 
Reschedulings in past years 
Rescheduling required next year 
Past IMF agreements  
Exchange rate regime 







































# The estimation was run on Stata using the robust probit estimation procedure with countries 
identified as the cluster. 
**, * refer to statistical significance at the 1% and 2% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively.  20
Table 3: The probabilities of signing an IMF agreement (1974-1989 and 1990-2000) 
 










All types  0.221  0.223  1324/1306 0.236  0.239  958/962 
1 (most fixed)  0.253  0.251  466/462  0.264  0.243  303/305 
2 (narrow bands)  0.162  0.170  297/294  0.194  0.187  242/246 
3 (wider,managed)  0.178  0.185  343/340  0.135  0.161  185/186 
4 (freely floating)  0.571  0.308  14/13  0.217  0.222  23/27 
5 (freely falling)  0.302  0.309  172/165  0.360  0.399  175/168 
4&5 (flexible)  0.323  .309  186/178  0.343  0.374  198/195 
6 (missing)  0.156  0.219  32/32  0.200  0.233  30/30 
 
Table 4: The probabilities of signing an IMF agreement (by income group) 
 










All types  0.256  0.262  1105/1097 0.210  0.205  1899/1904
1 (hard fixed)  0.272  0.266  580/579  0.193  0.182  669/676 
2 (narrow bands)  0.224  0.257  143/140  0.177  0.163  463/467 
3 (wider,managed)  0.225  0.233  227/223  0.188  0.196  431/433 
4 (freely floating)  0.414  0.290  29/31  0.125  0.111  8/9 
5 (freely falling)  0.263  0.308  95/91  0.361  0.375  269/259 
4&5 (flexible)  0.298  0.303  124/122  0.354  0.366  277/268 
6 (missing)  0.152  0.242  33/33  0.153  0.133  59/60 
 
 




































1  36 793 29 24 44  9 100  1
 d  90 10 50  2  94.2% 
2 36  14  27 505 38  24 0  1 50 8  0  2 91.2% 
3 75  4  29  17  27 479  100 1  43 40  0  2  88.2% 
4 0  1  0  1  100  1  36 28 68 6  0  0 75.7% 
5  83 12 53 19 43 30 88  8  50 295 50 4 80.2% 
6  40  5 0 1 0 2 0 1  100  1  37 52 80.0% 
Bold numbers identify continuing regimes 
a: percentage of cases in which the country signed an IMF agreement in the current or next year. 
b: number of country-years for which the previous and current year regime combinations were 
observed. 
c: percentage of countries that had a particular exchange rate regime in the current and previous year. 
d: There was only one country that started with a pure fixed exchange rate and moved to a pure floating 
exchange rate: Nicaragua in 1979. While the Nicaraguan government signed an agreement with the 
IMF the year it changed its exchange rate regime, it also changed its political regime and the 




Table 6: IMF signing and average number of months of agreement when the exchange 












% signed  Number 
of months
1 51 43  9.8 1  41 48 12.6 
2 52 35  7.8 2  73 36 9.2 
3 72 38  8.3 3  73 37 8.3 
4 10 50 11.6  4  16 63 14.0 
5 89 48 13.3  5  96 48 10.4 
6 14 43 10.1  6  13 23 8.2 
 
 
Table 7: The incidence of capital controls for different exchange rate regimes. 
 
Exchange Rate Regime  Number of observations Percentage  with  controls 
All 2670  84.3 
1 (most fixed)  909  80.4 
2 (narrow bands)  652  76.7 
3 (wider,managed)  598  93.1 
4 (freely floating)  56  100 
5 (freely falling)  386  88.1 
4 and 5 (flexible)  442  89.6 
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Appendix: Data definitions and sources.  
“Signing of an IMF agreement in the following year”. A binary variable indicating 
that a high conditionality IMF agreement (Stand-by, EFF, SAF/ESAF/PRGF)is signed 
in the following calendar year, given that a country was eligible to sign one. Source: 
IMF, Annual report, various years.  
 
“GNP per capita”. GNI per capita in thousands of $U.S., Atlas method (World Bank, 
World Development Indicator) deflated by U.S. consumer price index (IMF: IMF 
Financial Statistics). 
 
“GDP growth”.  Percentage change in GDP from the previous year (annual %). 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
“Reserves-to-imports”. Total foreign reserves divided by total imports of goods and 
services (both in current $US). Source: World Bank, Global Development Indicators. 
 
“% change in reserves-to-imports”. The percentage change in the reserves-to-import 
ratio from the previous year to the current year, as a proportion of the previous year.  
 
“Current Account Balannce/GDP”. The current account balance divided by total GDP 
(both in current $US). Source: World Bank, Global Development Indicators. 
 
“% change in the current account”. The percentage change in the current account 
balance from the previous year to the current year, expressed as a percentage of the 
previous year. 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Indicators. 
 
“Real exchange rate depreciation”. The official number of domestic currency units per 
$U.S. multiplied by the ratio of the U.S. consumer price index to the country’s 
consumer price index.  This number is calculated for the current year and for three 
years previously (adjusting for changes in base years) and the difference between the 
two is expressed as a proportion of the value from three years before. Source: World 
Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
“Debt-service ratio”. Total long-term debt service payments divided by total exports 
of goods and services (all in U.S. dollars).  Source: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
 
“% change in the debt-service-ratio”. The percentage change in the total debt service 
payments-to- exports ratio from the previous year to the current year, expressed as a 
percentage of the previous year. 
 
“Public external debt-to-GDP ratio”. The ratio of public and publicly guaranteed long-
term debt expressed as a ratio of total GDP.  Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
   23
“Current rescheduling”. A binary indicator of whether or not the country had to 
reschedule some portion of its debt (principal or interest, official or private) in the 
current year, which requires by convention an IMF agreement to be in place. Source: 
World Bank, Global Development Finance. 
 
“Reschedulings in past years”. The number of years out of the previous two years in 
which a country rescheduled some portion of its official or private interest or principal 
repayments. Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance. 
 
“Rescheduling required next year”. A binary indicator of whether or not the country is 
about to reschedule some portion of its debt (principal or interest, official or private) 
in the following year, which requires by convention an IMF agreement to be in place. 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance. 
 
“Past IMF agreements”.  A binary variable indicating whether an IMF arrangement 
has been in place for the country in any of the previous two years. Source: IMF, IMF 
Annual Report various years. 
 
“Exchange rate regime”. The numerical category of exchange rate regime, on a scale 
from 1 to 5 moving from the least flexible to the most flexible. A sixth category was 
for unclassified regimes. Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).  
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Notes 
 
1.  For a comprehensive and up-to-date review of the issues see Corden (2003). 
For a more succinct summary see Bird (2002). 
 
2.  For discussion of the bi-polar view see, for example, Eichengreen (1994), 
Fischer (2001), Goldstein (1999), Mussa and others (2000). For a 
comprehensive and excellent review of the arguments for and against 
alternative exchange rate regimes see Corden (2003). 
 
3.   Eichengreen (1994) provides a summary of currency crisis models. 
 
4.  Note here that the issue of interest is the nature of the exchange rate regime 
rather than changes in the exchange rate. During a crisis it is likely that, 
whatever the regime, the exchange rate will be adjusted and will depreciate. 
 
      5.  Other definitions of crisis are available. Thus Berg, Borensztein and Pattillo    
(2004) identify crises as having occurred when the weighted average of one-
month changes in exchange rates and reserves is more than three country 
specific standard deviations above the country average. 
  
      6.  Although they also state that ‘the appropriate support is not as overwhelming 
as one would expect’, (Bubula and Otker-Robe, 2003, p. 19). It is perhaps 
interesting that they expected the evidence to be ‘overwhelming’ given the 
theoretical ambivalence discussed earlier in this paper. 
 
7.  Using a different measure of crisis, Bordo et al (2001) find that for emerging 
economies pegs and limited flexibility carry a significantly higher risk of 
currency crisis than either managed or freely floating regimes. 
 
8.  Of the various classifications available which include Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2002, there are certain advantages associated with the one 
constructed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) as explained in Husain, Mody and 
Rogoff (2004). See Nitithanprapas and Willett (2002) for a further discussion 
of the issues involved in classifying exchange rate regimes. 
 
9.  Available at http://www.wam.umd.edu/~creinhar/Links.html 
 
10. The distinction between ‘freely floating’ and ‘freely falling’ makes sense for 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) in terms of classifying exchanges rate regimes, 
but is less helpful when considering exchange rate regime choice. Few 
countries would choose to have, nor could they engineer a ‘freely falling’ 
exchange rate. So categories 4 and 5 could be seen as one exchange rate 
regime choice (perfectly flexible). 
 
11. Reinhart and Rogoff report a full sample correlation of 0.42. 
 
12. Both of these probabilities are potentially relevant since the operation of a 
certain exchange rate regime may contribute to the onset of economic   25
                                                                                                                                            
problems and an IMF programme in the current year or in the future. If the 
exchange rate regime is changed as a consequence of these economic 
difficulties, the signing of the agreement may be incorrectly attributed to the 
regime that was established after the crisis. 
 
13. We re-tested the results in Table 1 using the number of months in a year 
during which a country was under an IMF programme. The results correspond 
to those presented in Table 1. Essentially this test implies that the results are 
not arising as a consequence of countries with intermediate exchange rate 
regimes signing longer-term agreements with the Fund. 
 
14. Bird (1996), Bird and Rowlands (2001), Conway (1994), Joyce (1992), Knight 
and Santaella (1997), Thacker (1999), and Vreeland (2003). 
 
15. Alternative models using additional political and institutional variables were 
also estimated, but the key results are comparable to those reported here.  
 
16. It should be noted that when the flexible exchange rate category was left 
divided into the original “freely floating” and “freely falling” categories, the 
former had the lowest association with IMF agreements and the latter the 
highest. The fixed exchange rate category coefficient in the estimations was 
always statistically significantly higher than for the other categories. In one 
form of the estimating equation, however, the estimated coefficient for the 
flexible category was different from that of the intermediate category only 
with a somewhat weaker level of statistical significance.  
 
17. We identified countries as low income or middle income for the full sample, 
regardless of per capita income changes over time. The GNP per capita (Atlas 
method) average was $US 590 for the low-income group, and $US 3686 for 
the middle-income group. To some extent this may proxy for the degree of 
financial development and allows us to see whether increasing financial 
development and liberalisation undermines the association between 
intermediate exchange rate regimes and the incidence of IMF programmes. 
 
18. This relationship may vary over time. The IMF (2004) finds that ‘countries are 
no more likely to alter their exchange rate regime at the outset of a Fund-
supported program than otherwise.’ 
 
19. These data are far from ideal, as the IMF itself recognized in 1997 when it 
began publishing a more detailed account of capital controls in its member 
states. For the most part the new reporting system seemed to yield a series that 
corresponded well to the earlier reporting system. The measure, however, 
remains a crude one. In his analysis of capital account liberalization and IMF 
programme and resource use, Rowlands (1999) discusses additional problems 
with the data.   
 
20.  In one estimation, capital controls did appear to have a strongly significant 
negative effect on the probability of an IMF programme. This occurred when 
the constant was left out of the equation. Given the high correlation between   26
                                                                                                                                            
the presence of controls and the constant, this result was considered to reflect 
multicollinearity rather than a reliable result.  
 
21. For a further discussion of the potentially superior policy tradeoffs offered by 
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